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Despite his outstanding contributions to mathematics and astronomy Johannes 
Kepler’s work has suffered relative neglect in the English-speaking world. The 
books of Ms. Field and Mr. Stephenson have moved to remedy that neglect. They 
nicely complement each other. Each deals with different but related aspects of his 
thought; both are essential reading for serious students of Kepler’s achievements. 
Field laments that scholars have ignored Kepler’s cosmology as expounded in 
his Mysterium cosmographicum and Harmonices mundi libri V. Both works have 
been neglected, she maintains, except insofar as the former acts as a precursor to 
the Astronomia nova and as the latter includes Kepler’s third law. Field finds 
this situation particularly regrettable because Kepler’s cosmology influenced the 
development of his astronomical ideas. She thus sets out to reassert Kepler’s 
cosmology in the context of his astronomical and mathematical achievements. 
Field begins by placing Kepler’s cosmology in the historical tradition of Plato’s 
Timaeus and Proclus’s Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements. In 
his Mysterium cosmographicum (1596) Kepler suggested that the ratios of the 
distances between the six observable planets were equivalent to the ratios between 
the five Platonic solids. As Field notes, Plato’s Timaeus suggested outlines for 
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possible cosmological explanations; Kepler constructed a testable mathematical 
model. 
Although Kepler’s cosmological picture was wrong, Field notes that the relation- 
ship between observable fact and Kepler’s theory was fairly good. Furthermore, 
none of Kepler’s later work, which resulted in his three laws of planetary motion, 
indicated that his theory was incorrect. Kepler believed that as long as observa- 
tions confirmed his theory, he could continue to accept it. A theory had to be 
discarded only when observation proved it incorrect. Field asserts the modernity 
of Kepler’s thought in this. 
Observation did not prove Kepler incorrect during his lifetime even though, as 
Field shows, Kepler had already constructed at least one more regular polyhedron 
by 1599. Moreover, his cosmological theory was popular enough to warrant a 
second edition in 1621. Kepler reprinted the 1596 text with extensive notes that 
modified the text. In some cases Kepler declared his original ideas no longer 
tenable. But he still considered his mathematical chapters valid. His laws refined 
the picture, but, as Field notes, he still saw geometrical facts as corollaries to 
physical facts and the motions of the planets as defining geometrical structures. 
Field next discusses the Harmonice mundi, which put forth a more comprehen- 
sive cosmological theory than the Mysterium cosmographicum. The five books 
deal with pure and applied mathematics, music theory, astrology, and astronomy. 
Field handles the two mathematical books together, briefly describing Kepler’s 
creative, often original, work on regular polygons, congruences, tessellations, and 
faces. Historians of mathematics have often found these two books fruitful sources 
for studying mathematical developments. On the other hand, the three cosmologi- 
cal chapters have been too frequently dismissed as “mystical,” “Pythagorean,” 
or “Hermetic,” with the notable exception of the third law, which was virtually 
tacked on to the astronomical chapter just before it went to press. But Field notes 
Kepler’s doubts about the authenticity of the Hermetic corpus and his claims 
against the adequacy of particular numerological theories. She maintains that the 
third law does not affect Kepler’s cosmological picture nor is it relevant to his 
theory of musical ratios among the planetary velocities. Nevertheless, it has cos- 
mological significance because of the deduction of the dimensions of the planetary 
spheres from harmonic archetypes. Finally, Field reiterates an argument she made 
elsewhere (Kepler’s rejection of numerology, in Occult and Scientific Mentalities 
in the Renaissance, B. W. Vickers, Ed., Cambridge, pp. 273-296, Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984) that Kepler’s Harmonice mundi was modeled 
on Ptolemy’s Harmonica and attempted to supplant it. 
Field’s conclusions are mild in light of what she has written. She claims that her 
study does not confirm the historiographical tradition that sees Kepler as the last 
Pythagorean cosmologist. She sees him as essentially modern. She minimizes his 
differences with the Rosicrucian Robert Fludd but stresses Kepler’s demand that 
theories fit observations as a crucial difference between them. Given Kepler’s 
loquacity and tendency to identify himself with certain traditions, Field deems it 
likely that he would not have hesitated to admit it if he were writing for a cult of 
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Pythagorean or neo-Platonic initiates. Moreover, his silence about any Hermetic 
influence would suggest that Kepler did not see himself as influenced by that 
tradition. Field suggests that Kepler was a “radical Platonist” and his Platonism 
came directly from the source, not through any intermediary, mystical or oth- 
erwise. 
Field’s arguments lead the reader to reject the oft-mentioned idea that Kepler 
was a mystic, but she stops short of stating this. Surprisingly, Stephenson is more 
forthright in his rejection of Kepler’s “mysticism,” for his book is far more 
narrowly focused than Field’s and does not deal with activities and concepts 
that would entail such a conclusion. It may result from the frustration of the 
internalist-and Stephenson’s book, which is primarily an extended explication 
des textes, seems to carry the internalist position to its extreme-for the careful 
reader who studies Kepler’s works will search in vain for the mystic. To call 
Kepler a mystic is either to distort Kepler’s thought or to misconstrue mysticism. 
Stephenson seeks to elucidate the steps by which Kepler developed his planetary 
theory. He defines his topic as “Kepler’s search for physical principles from 
which, by mathematical demonstration, he could learn the true motions of the 
planets” (p. 7). Thus, his focus is narrow, as will probably be his audience. It is 
not because Kepler’s physical theories were correct in and of themselves that 
they interest Stephenson. He not only deems them incorrect but maintains that 
Keplerian forces were not analogues of or precursors to Newtonian forces. His 
interest in Keplerian physical theories lies in the fact that they bore fruit in Kepler’s 
astronomy. 
Stephenson primarily discusses three works: Mysteriurn cosmographicum, 
Astronomia nova, and Epitome of Copernican Astronomy. In this context, 
Kepler’s first book is useful because of the questions Kepler posed. His search for 
the number, size, and motion of the spheres was, according to Stephenson, a novel 
quest. Stephenson does not consider the Mysterium cosmographicum a work 
rooted in an overall conception of astronomy, as Kepler was only looking for a 
pattern; nevertheless, Kepler was trying to describe not mathematical hypotheses 
but rather the real universe. 
Stephenson necessarily concentrates his efforts on the Astronomia nova. Of 
general interest is his claim that this work was not written as a strictly chronological 
account of Kepler’s astronomical discoveries. (This claim is reinforced by W. H. 
Donahue in his article, Kepler’s fabricated figures: Covering up the mess in the 
New Astronomy, Journal for the History of Astronomy 19, 217-237 (1988). Of 
course, neither author could have known the other’s work as the dates of publica- 
tion are too close.) Stephenson maintains that Kepler knew he would have at best 
a formidable task in persuading his contemporaries to accept his ideas, and the 
cumbersome account detailing his failures as well as his successes was used to 
convince his readers that there were no viable alternatives to his theories. Thus, 
Kepler’s steps were deliberate, not haphazard and accidental. 
Stephenson discusses the physical question, that is, how the planets moved, 
libration theory, the work on Mars, and the physical synthesis. He very carefully 
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delineates Kepler’s mathematical steps toward his synthesis. Stephenson shows 
how Kepler used the mathematics at his disposal creatively to make it do more 
than it was intended to do so that it led him to his goal. For example, in working 
out his libration theory Kepler unsuccessfully tried to work with conchoids. One 
of his models proved to correspond to his theory of how planets moved in ellipses. 
He did not know this when he wrote the earlier chapter. 
On how planets moved Stephenson discusses Kepler’s belief in planetary souls 
and minds. Unfortunately, he calls it the ‘ ‘mental” theory. This would be confusing 
to many readers because it is usually given the technical name of the “animistic” 
idea, and Kepler, of course, was instrumental in overturning it. Stephenson’s 
bibliography is limited and has no book-length work that deals with early cosmol- 
ogy, particularly the Middle Ages. Conspicuously absent as regards earlier plane- 
tary theory is Dijksterhuis’ The Mechanization of the World Picture. Stephenson 
also valiantly tries to come up with an understandable translation of Kepler’s 
elusive neologism species immateriata, the force that Kepler maintained kept the 
planets in their orbits. Most scholars do not attempt a translation. Stephenson’s 
suggestion that species be taken to mean “image” is an excellent idea, and I hope 
this translation becomes general. However, I quarrel with his translation of the 
entire phrase as ‘ ‘immaterial image. ’ ’ Kepler’s contemporaries did indeed under- 
stand imma teriu tus to mean ‘ ‘immaterial, ’ ’ and that has been taken as its meaning 
since, but Kepler probably meant “immaterial-like” by the word, which he coined. 
A force in Kepler’s terminology could not be “immaterial” because it was by its 
very nature physical. 
The last work Stephenson discusses is the underappreciated Epitome of Coperni- 
can Astronomy. This is the textbook Kepler wrote that served as the vehicle for 
the diffusion of his astronomical theories to the scientific community of Europe. 
In particular, Stephenson draws attention to the improvements Kepler made in 
both the libration and the lunar theories in the years after the publication of the 
Astronomia nova. 
Both of the books under review here represent valuable additions to the study 
of Kepler. I highly recommend them for historians of mathematics interested in 
Kepler and his period as well as for historians of astronomy. 
In addition, both books have useful glossaries, bibliographies, and indices, and 
Field’s book has four appendices as well. 
Das Prinzip der kleinsten Wirkung und die Kraftkonzeptionen der rationalen Me- 
chanik: Eine Untersuchung zur Grundlegungsproblematik bei Leonhard 
Euler, Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis und Joseph Louis Lagrange. 
Helmut Pulte. Studia Leibnitiana, vol. 19. Stuttgart (Steiner). 1989. xi + 309 
PP. 
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Institute for the History 
Reviewed by Craig G. Fraser 
and Philosophy of Science and Technology, 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S IK7 
University of Toronto, 
Although Euler’s study of the principle of least action occupied a minor place in 
his physical science, it played a major role in the 18th-century history of varia- 
tional mechanics. His initial formulation of the principle in 1744, an interesting 
application of the calculus of variations to dynamics, provided precise mathemati- 
cal expression for the ideas of his influential contemporary, Pierre de Maupertuis. 
His memoirs of the early 175Os, written at the time of the priority dispute with 
Koenig, although of lesser technical interest, provided the inspiration and some of 
the ideas for Lagrange’s subsequent extensive contributions to variational me- 
chanics. 
In his analytical mechanics Euler accepted the Newtonian conception of force. 
His memoir of 1750 entitled “Decouverte d’un nouveau principe de mecanique” 
first introduced as an explicit general law the differential-equation form of what is 
known today as ‘ ‘Newton’s second law. ” It would nevertheless be a mistake, 
Helmut Pulte claims, to regard Euler’s project in mechanics as entirely mathemat- 
ical. He was also interested in questions of natural philosophy. Throughout his 
career he regarded the concept of force as provisional, as something that in 
principle could be derived from the purely corporeal properties of matter in mo- 
tion. In this sense, as well as in the a priori emphasis of his theory, his thought 
exhibited definite Cartesian tendencies. 
Pulte is concerned with the historical development of Euler’s philosophical 
views on force and with the connection of these views to his work in variational 
mechanics. He distinguishes two stages in this development. In his early writings, 
from around 1736 to the mid-1740s, Euler regarded the concept of inertia as the 
ultimate foundation of force. His correspondence with Daniel Bernoulli during 
this period shows an interest in providing a purely mechanical explanation for the 
gravitational motion of a particle. His first formulation of the principle of least 
action, involving a single freely moving mass acted upon by a force, attributed the 
minimal action of the force to the particle’s inertial resistance. 
In the late 1740s Euler began to investigate problems of collision, a subject 
Maupertuis was studying at the same time using his action principle. Euler came 
to the conclusion that inertia alone was inadequate to explain the basic phenome- 
non of impact. He turned instead to the concept of corporeal impenetrability to 
account for the changes of motion in collision. He developed this thesis in his 1750 
“Recherches sur l’origine des forces,” a memoir Pulte considers pivotal in the 
evolution of his natural philosophy. Pulte suggests that, with his new emphasis on 
impenetrability, Euler had renounced his original program of providing an essen- 
tially mathematical mechanics, that philosophical concerns now occupied a cen- 
tral place in his foundational thought, and that a permanent schism had opened 
between his mathematical Newtonianism and his Cartesian natural philosophy. 
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Pulte sees deep affinities between Euler’s mature physical thought and his subse- 
quent elaboration of the principle of least action in the memoirs of the Berlin 
Society. 
Pulte builds his book around the historical thesis just outlined. He regards 
Maupertuis -in contrast to Euler-as someone who interpreted the “economy of 
nature” in terms of a theological occasionalism derived from Malebranche. La- 
grange, however, is situated at the other end of the metaphysical-mathematical 
spectrum. His thinking on the foundation of mechanics went through at least two 
major stages, and his formal development of the subject diverged from that of the 
Newtonians. Nevertheless, in eschewing natural philosophy in favor of technical 
development, he implicitly accepted the Newtonian conception of force. 
The strength of Das Prinzip der kleinsten Wirkung lies in its documentation of 
natural philosophy as a consistent theme in Euler’s mechanical writings. Although 
Euler’s discussions lacked the clarity and incisiveness of his more technical re- 
searches, he was sufficiently engaged in the subject to commit himself repeatedly 
in print. Pulte has marshalled a significant quantity of material to illuminate this 
dimension of his thought. He argues convincingly for the rejection of the historical 
attempts by Hermann von Helmholtz, Adolf Kneser, and Cornelius Lanczos to 
link Leibniz and conservation laws to Euler’s physical science. He also shows 
that a fundamental problem of Kantian philosophy, the delimitation of boundaries 
between natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics, was not an Eulerian 
concern; Euler’s primary goal was to ground mathematical mechanics in a theory 
of matter. 
Pulte is less successful in establishing connections between Euler’s natural 
philosophy and his variational mechanics. The evidence, while often interesting, 
is circumstantial; the passages in question require considerable latitude of inter- 
pretation and seem no more than suggestive. (An example in question is the 
passage from the “Recherches” quoted on p. 168, in which Euler argues that the 
forces developed in impact are the smallest possible to produce the given change 
in motion. He cites as justification the fact that “tous les changements au monde 
sont produits aux moindres depens qu’il est possible,” a reasoning Pulte feels is 
significantly related to his understanding of least action.) Although Pulte dutifully 
recounts the technical derivations of the principle of least action by Euler and 
Lagrange, he is not concerned with a close analysis of their content. His account 
of Euler’s 1744 essay is less complete than Herman Goldstine’s A History of the 
Calculus of Variations from the 17th through the 19th Century [ 19801, and I 
thought he misunderstood my own discussion of Lagrange in [Fraser 19831. 
There is a danger in seeking an understanding of the conceptual foundations of 
mechanics in an author’s philosophical writings. Definite conceptions relating 
mathematics and physics are also implicit in the technical science, in, for exam- 
ple, Euler’s analysis of the elastica or d’Alembert’s investigation of constrained 
systems. These individuals were primarily mathematical scientists, and it is rea- 
sonable that their deepest convictions should have been expressed in their work 
itself. 
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A general difficulty concerns Pulte’s tendency to oppose Newtonian mathemati- 
cal mechanics on the one hand and Cartesian natural philosophy on the other. A 
prominent feature of “Cartesian” thought in the eighteenth century was an em- 
phasis on the essential mathematical character of physical reality. This attitude 
manifested itself not only in a belief in the logical necessity of physical laws but 
also in the very conception of matter as impenetrable geometrical extension. 
Thomas Hankins [ 19701 has convincingly documented the Cartesian character of 
d’Alembert’s mathematical dynamics, a thesis that is (implicitly) supported in full 
technical detail in my own study of d’Alembert’s principle [Fraser 19851. Contra 
Pulte (p. 177), I thought that many of the points he raises concerning Cartesian 
natural philosophy in reference to Euler are illustrated rather more clearly in 
d’Alembert’s Trait& de Dynamique. What is at issue is an opposition, not between 
Newtonian mathematics and Cartesian philosophy but between a mathematical 
mechanics derived strictly from first principles (a la Descartes) and one that 
countenances the introduction of irreducible ideal entities (a la Newton). 
The preceding criticisms should not obscure the positive contribution of Pulte’s 
book. His introduction contains a discussion of the historical theories of Kuhn and 
Lakatos with an indication of how they must be modified to explain the history of 
l&h-century mechanics. The methodical and careful research evident in the text, 
notes, and bibliography will provide a source for our understanding of Euler’s 
natural philosophy, an aspect of his scientific thought that has been neglected in 
the history of mathematics. Pulte has added to the growing body of historical 
literature documenting the Cartesian dimension of 18th-century physical science. 
Finally, for those interested in the origin and early development of variational 
principles, his book will prove an informative survey of the subject. 
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